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NO. 39 OCTOBER 2019 Introduction 
For a Peaceful Transition in Sudan 
Current Developments and Plausible Scenarios 
Annette Weber 
There seems to be no end to the good news coming from the Horn of Africa. First, the 
Nobel peace prize for Ethiopia’s young reformer Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Octo-
ber and then, in April, Sudan’s dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown after thirty 
years of rule. After months of civil and peaceful protests, it was actually the Sudanese 
military that finally forced the ruler out of office. Then, less than four months later, 
military leaders and civilians led by Abdalla Hamdok, an economist with decades of 
experience at the United Nations, managed to form a government. Whether the tran-
sition continues to develop positively will depend on the willingness of the security 
apparatus to transfer power to civilian leaders. However, in stabilising the country 
and improving its economic performance much will depend on whether and to what 
extent external actors support Sudan’s transformation process. 
 
At the top of the agenda is the economic 
upturn required to satisfy the population’s 
expectations as the tide of positive events 
begins to ebb. The new government will 
also need to find peace with armed groups 
in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. Ques-
tions of accountability and justice are 
equally prevalent. This will be no easy task 
for the transition councils and the cabinet 
since, after thirty years of Islamist military 
rule, the population has little confidence in 
state structures, the judiciary or the security 
sector. 
In addition to these tasks, the divergent 
interests of the actors involved are a mas-
sive stress test for consolidating the tran-
sition. As a result, the civilian side faces a 
security apparatus mainly comprising those 
who benefitted from the old regime. Not 
only must the protesters’ polarising ideol-
ogies and their demands for representation 
be taken into account, but so must those 
of the armed movements. 
From protest movement to 
transitional government 
Demonstrations were held in December 
2018 after subsidies for bread, oil and 
petrol were cut, resulting in large parts 
of the population no longer being able to 
afford basic living costs. The protesters’ 
demands for a better supply of basic com-
modities quickly transformed into a call 
for political change. The protests remained 
peaceful, despite provocation from the in-
telligence service and government-backed 
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militia. During the day, the streets were 
mainly occupied by women, students and 
representatives of various professional 
associations while, at night, young men 
picketed the gates of the barracks calling 
for the military to join them. 
More than 250 people were killed by the 
security forces during the protests, thou-
sands were wounded and hundreds were 
imprisoned, tortured and raped. These 
actions revealed clear rifts within the Suda-
nese security apparatus. The military police, 
who were subordinate to the intelligence 
service, and in particular the Rapid Support 
Forces (RSF) were responsible for firing tear 
gas and live rounds at protestors. However, 
some members of the military sided with 
the demonstrators and returned fire. 
President Bashir was removed from office 
in a military putsch on 11 April and a Tran-
sitional Military Council (TMC) set up.  The 
civilian actors who had joined the Forces of 
Freedom and Change (FFC) began negotia-
tions with the TMC to form a government. 
However, progress was sluggish and even-
tually came to an abrupt halt after a violent 
attempt on 3 July to clear a protest camp 
claimed 120 lives. 
The African Union (AU) sent an envoy 
flanked by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia 
and a prominent Ethiopian mediator. 
Despite the violent attacks on demonstra-
tors and repeated breakdowns in the nego-
tiations, they were able to establish a tran-
sitional government in less than eight 
months with the support of a Sudanese 
team of mediators. 
The transitional government consists of 
a Sovereignty Council made up of six civil-
ians and five members of the TMC. Lieuten-
ant-General Burhan will lead the Sovereignty 
Council for the first 21 months, after which 
a non-military actor will take charge. In 
addition, the cabinet, also composed of 
civilians and military, is the executive body 
responsible for setting and implementing 
policy. 
Whether the transition is successful, 
whether the government holds together 
and whether the country achieves peace, 
depend on two crucial factors: the leader 
of the RSF, General Mohammed Hamdan 
Daglo – also known as Hemedti – and 
tangible progress on turning the economy 
around. Nevertheless, sociopolitical issues, 
such as giving young people a say in politi-
cal matters and overcoming the discrepan-
cies between urban and rural areas, are also 
important. 
Actors 
Civilian actors. The civilian camp of the 
transitional government is made up of 
representatives of professional associations 
and trade unions (the Sudanese Profession-
als Association, SPA), protesters without 
no ties to other organisations and the tradi-
tional political parties. In the case of the 
civilian forces, it will be a matter of recon-
ciling the politically and ideologically con-
tradictory positions of actors such as the 
Communists and the Islamists.  It will also 
be important to represent the rights of the 
women and young people who risked their 
lives during the demonstrations, but who 
had no seat at the negotiating table and are 
insufficiently represented in the transition 
government. 
Military. The grouping within the security 
apparatus with the most personnel is the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Despite their 
participation in the war in South Sudan 
and in Dafur they still enjoy a level of 
respect among the population because 
throughout the history of the country they 
have repeatedly overthrown dictators who 
came to power in coups d’état. The Suda-
nese Armed Forces (SAF), directly under the 
control of President Bashir, are now repre-
sented by Lieutenant-General Burhan who 
will also be in charge of the Sovereignty 
Council for the next 21 months. 
The RSF lead by General Daglo (Hemedti) 
was also under the direct command of 
President Bashir. It is the most opaque and 
potentially decisive force in the security 
camp. Since the RSF soldiers fought in the 
war in Yemen as part of the Saudi-Emirati 
Coalition, they are better trained than the 
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SAF soldiers. They are also financially more 
independent because they were paid directly 
by the Gulf States, unlike the SAF whose 
salaries largely come from the state coffers. 
Some of them have now been deployed on 
behalf of the Emirates to support General 
Haftar in Libya, while others have taken on 
the role of the army and intelligence service 
in Khartoum and their presence is most 
visible there. RSF troops are also respon-
sible for securing the border between Chad 
and Darfur and the border with Libya. 
General Daglo is suspected of being in-
volved in irregular gold mining operations 
and illegal smuggling networks. Over the 
past few years, he has mainly been recruit-
ing fighters from the periphery who, like 
himself, are considered second-class citizens 
by the central elite. They are therefore more 
loyal to General Daglo, than they are to 
Sudan. 
The third force in the security apparatus 
is the National Intelligence and Security 
Service (NISS), which is also responsible for 
counterinsurgency units and was consid-
ered a close ally to long-time ruler Bashir. 
The NISS were largely responsible for the 
arrests and incidents of torture. 
Also deserving of a mention are the 
armed movements on the periphery, such 
as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), 
which comprises armed movements from 
Darfur and the region on the border with 
Southern Sudan.  The SRF is demanding 
to be a part of the transition government. 
Scenarios 
After thirty years of authoritarian rule, a 
radical new beginning is as necessary as it is 
challenging, given the marginalisation of 
those on the periphery and the mafia-like 
interdependence between the government 
apparatus, the Islamist elite and the 
military. 
Military coup: Hemedti takes over 
In this scenario, Hemedti takes power. 
Whether he makes himself leader after the 
coup or controls the country from behind 
the scenes is of secondary importance. 
Hemedti’s particular strategic skills lie 
in communicating with the periphery, by 
acting as a mediator in conflicts between 
ethnic groups, seeking talks with Sheiks 
and local rural leaders and reaching out to 
the Darfur rebels. While the Sudanese elites 
of the Nile Valley underestimate them as 
uneducated and provincial, he has posi-
tioned himself as a populist and representa-
tive of the marginalised. Hemedti has built 
up his own independent empire in a very 
short space of time and, at the same time, 
is also the deputy president of the TMC. The 
RSF leader can rely on support from the 
Emirates. A coup would sour relations with 
the West. This would, in turn, harm the 
country’s economic development, but would 
allow Hemedti to consolidate his power. 
War in the security apparatus 
In this scenario, centrifugal forces would 
cause the military council to fragment, pos-
sibly leading to a war between the military, 
the RSF and the intelligence services. The 
Western donor countries would cease their 
announced support, the AU would suspend 
Sudan’s membership and the required eco-
nomic recovery would be blocked. The Gulf 
States and Egypt, who are committed to 
maintaining a military government, a ‘Sisi-
light’ scenario, would be called upon to 
mediate. Otherwise, still being of geopoliti-
cal interest, Sudan would become a play-
ground for proxy wars. The result would be 
a destabilising of the region, from the Red 
Sea to the Sahel. 
The civilian government collapses 
In the protest camp there is resistance to 
the TMC continuing to form part of the 
transition government. Old political parties 
and the SRF claim to be directly represented 
in the transition councils. The ideological 
confrontations between the formerly pow-
erful Islamists and secular political forces 
are exacerbating the situation and para-
lysing the government. If the various camps 
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block the legislature and parts of the execu-
tive, it is not unlikely for the transitional 
military council to take power and pro-
claim a military government. Here it could 
count on support from the Gulf States, but 
not from the AU or the West. 
Consolidation and reconstruction 
Sudanese actors are subordinating their 
power interests to a larger national con-
sensus. They see consolidation, which is 
supported by a wide range of international 
actors, as a historic opportunity. Everyone 
has an interest in seeing Sudan stabilised: 
the AU, the Gulf States, China, the West 
and the United Nations (UN). 
Its greatest challenge is its weak economy. 
At present, the country is largely dependent 
on oil from South Sudan and injections of 
capital from the Gulf States. Prime Minister 
Hamdok has requested eight billion US dol-
lars to support the strategy he intends to 
pursue over the next two years and two bil-
lion US dollars in foreign reserve deposits. 
His plans also require debt relief and access 
to international financial institutions. More-
over, it is important he initiates a rapid 
diversification of the economy and makes 
greater efforts to break up the mafia-like 
entanglements of the old regime. Expand-
ing agriculture, promoting investment and 
building industry are just as necessary as 
the return of the well-trained Sudanese 
people needed to rebuild Sudan’s ailing 
economy. 
Recommendations 
Outside financial support will be required 
to successfully consolidate the country. 
The Friends of Sudan is a group comprising 
multilateral organisations (AU, UN and EU), 
as well as Germany, France, the US and UK 
who have come together to work with the 
Gulf States to find a solution to Sudan’s 
economic misery. This group could assume 
a coordinating role. A decision on resuming 
German-Sudanese development coopera-
tion, which was discontinued in 1989 after 
Bashir’s military coup, should be taken by 
the Bundestag as soon as possible. 
Despite the great euphoria, we should 
not lose sight of the potential dangers and 
setbacks for the transition. Next year, lead-
ership is supposed to be handed over to the 
civilian part of the government. Then it will 
become clear whether the military is pre-
pared to act as a supporter of democratisa-
tion or whether it succumbs to its own 
ambitions of power. Last but not least, the 
hybrid deployment of the AU and the UN in 
Darfur (UNAMID) should not be terminated 
prematurely. The political component of 
UNAMID continues to be important: the 
ability to register human rights violations 
and maintain access to humanitarian aid 
until a stable civilian government is firmly 
established in Khartoum. 
Dr Annette Weber is a Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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